The average detection probability of the quantum dialogue protocol under
  the disturbance attack is 3/4 by An, Nguyen Ba
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
04
06
17
9v
1 
 2
4 
Ju
n 
20
04
The average detection probability of the quantum dialogue protocol under the
disturbance attack is 3/4
Nguyen Ba An∗
School of Computational Sciences, Korea Institute for Advanced Study,
207-43 Cheongryangni 2-dong, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul 130-722, Republic of Korea
We prove explicitly that the detection probability of the disturbance attack in the recently pro-
posed quantum dialogue protocol is 3/4 in average. The purpose is not only to reply a comment but
also to provide a deeper understanding of a kind of tampering in an unauthorized communication.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk
Of late Cai made a comment [1] on our protocol [2] that enables two authorized parties to securely exchange their
messages in a deterministic and direct manner resembling a dialogue, hence the name “quantum dialogue” protocol (a
similar idea with less capacity was touched upon earlier in [3] where no full sets of steps necessary enough to securely
process the protocol were shown; see also [4] for a different possible scheme). Cai remarked that the detection
probability d of the disturbance attack per control mode run is 1/2 but not 3/4 as said in [2].
First, if Cai’s notification were right, it does not so much influence the quantum dialogue protocol which remains
still asymptotically secure. Second, however, in average d should be 3/4 indeed, instead of 1/2, as will be shown
explicitly now. To make it rigorous and explicit as much as possible we shall not be shy to expose the mathematical
formulation in full detail in what follows.
At the beginning, i.e. in the preparation stage, Bob is supposed to be provided with a large enough number of
maximally two-qubit entangled states (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs)
|Ψ0,0〉ht =
1√
2
(|0〉h |1〉t + |1〉h |0〉t) . (1)
Bob encodes his two secrete bits k, l ∈ {0, 1} by applying Ctk,l (Ct0,0 = 1̂, Ct0,1 = σtx, Ct1,0 = σty, Ct1,1 = σtz , and σtx,y,z
the Pauli matrices) on qubit t to have the state
|Ψk,l〉ht =
1√
2
(|0〉h Ctk,l |1〉t + |1〉h Ctk,l |0〉t) , (2)
and sends qubit t to Alice. One way to disturb the communication is that Eve, the eavesdropper, measures the qubit
t on the B → A route (similar results will be obtained if Eve’s measurement is to be made on the A→ B route) [5].
Eve’s measurement outcome is that either
(a) she finds the state |1〉t or
(b) she finds the state |0〉t,
with a probability of 50% each. Then Eve sends on the measured qubit t to Alice. In case (a) the Alice-Bob pair
state collapses into
|0〉h Ctk,l |1〉t , (3)
whereas in case (b) it is
|1〉h Ctk,l |0〉t . (4)
Alice being unaware of Eve’s tampering encodes her two confidential bits i, j ∈ {0, 1} by applying Cti,j on the qubit t
Eve has just sent her, then returns it back to Bob. In case (a) the Alice-Bob pair state becomes∣∣∣Φ(a)〉
ht
= |0〉h Cti,jCtk,l |1〉t = |0〉h Cti⊕k,j⊕l |1〉t , (5)
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2whereas in case (b) it is ∣∣∣Φ(b)〉
ht
= |1〉hCti,jCtk,l |0〉t = |1〉h Cti⊕k,j⊕l |0〉t . (6)
In Eqs. (5) and (6) the ⊕ stands for an addition mod 2 and we have omitted the unimportant phase factor φi,j,k,l for
simplicity (see [2] for its explicit expression).
Now we observe the following identities
Cta,b |1〉t ≡ (−1)aδa⊕b,0 |1〉t + (i)aδa⊕b,1 |0〉t (7)
and
Cta,b |0〉t ≡ δa⊕b,0 |0〉t + (−i)aδa⊕b,1 |1〉t (8)
which can directly be verified for any a, b ∈ {0, 1}. In Eqs. (7) and (8) δm,n is the Kroneker symbol. Using the
identities (7) and (8) in Eqs. (5) and (6), respectively, yields∣∣∣Φ(a)〉
ht
= (−1)i⊕kδJ,0 |01〉ht + (i)i⊕kδJ,1 |00〉ht (9)
and ∣∣∣Φ(b)〉
ht
= δJ,0 |10〉ht + (−i)i⊕kδJ,1 |11〉ht (10)
where J ≡ i⊕ k ⊕ j ⊕ l.
Another universal (i.e., valid for any µ, ν ∈ {0, 1}) identity which can also be justified by direct inspection is
|µν〉ht =
1√
2
(|Ψ0,µ⊕ν〉ht + (−1)µ |Ψ1,µ⊕ν〉ht) . (11)
Use of the identity (11) in Eqs. (9) and (10) re-expresses the latter in the Bell basis as∣∣∣Φ(a)〉
ht
=
1√
2
(−1)i⊕kδJ,0
(|Ψ0,1〉ht + |Ψ1,1〉ht)
+
1√
2
(i)i⊕kδJ,1
(|Ψ0,0〉ht + |Ψ1,0〉ht) (12)
and ∣∣∣Φ(b)〉
ht
=
1√
2
δJ,0
(|Ψ0,1〉ht − |Ψ1,1〉ht)
+
1√
2
(−i)i⊕kδJ,1
(|Ψ0,0〉ht − |Ψ1,0〉ht) . (13)
The above formulae (12) and (13) allow us to calculate the average detection probability. Namely, since i, j, k, l ∈
{0, 1} there are four possibilities in all:
(i) {i⊕ k = 0, j ⊕ l = 0} ⇒ J = 0,
(ii) {i⊕ k = 0, j ⊕ l = 1} ⇒ J = 1,
(iii) {i⊕ k = 1, j ⊕ l = 0} ⇒ J = 1,
(iv) {i⊕ k = 1, j ⊕ l = 1} ⇒ J = 0.
We first deal with case (a) employing Eq. (12). In case (a,i) the detection probability is d(a,i) = 1 since Bob never
finds state |Ψi⊕k,j⊕l〉ht = |Ψ0,0〉ht as he should in Eve’s absence. In case (a,ii) the detection probability is d(a,ii) = 1
also since Bob never finds state |Ψi⊕k,j⊕l〉ht = |Ψ0,1〉ht as he should in Eve’s absence. In case (a,iii) the detection
probability is d(a,iii) = 1/2 since there is a 50% probability that Bob finds state |Ψi⊕k,j⊕l〉ht = |Ψ0,0〉ht indicating
Eve’s presence. In this case Bob should find state |Ψi⊕k,j⊕l〉ht = |Ψ1,0〉ht if there is no eavesdropping, but that just as
well occurs with a probability of 50%. Finally, in case (a,iv) the detection probability is d(a,iv) = 1/2 also since there
is a 50% probability that Bob finds state |Ψi⊕k,j⊕l〉ht = |Ψ0,1〉ht indicating Eve’s presence. In this case Bob should
3find state |Ψi⊕k,j⊕l〉ht = |Ψ1,1〉ht if there is no eavesdropping, but that occurs only with a probability of 50%. With
all the four above possible situations taken into account in case (a) the average detection probability is calculated as
d(a) =
1
4
iv∑
q=i
d(a,q) =
1
4
(
1 + 1 +
1
2
+
1
2
)
=
3
4
. (14)
Similarly, employing Eq. (13) for case (b) we arrive at the results d(b,i) = d(b,ii) = 1 and d(b,iii) = d(b,iv) = 1/2
yielding again d(b) = 3/4. Hence, no matter which measurement outcome Eve gets the average detection probability
under the disturbance attack by measuring qubit t en route is d = 3/4.
Another way for Eve to disturb information is to apply a Ctu,v on qubit t when it travels in between Alice and
Bob. In the original (one-way) ping-pong protocol [6], where control mode and message mode are distinguishable,
Eve can surely avoid all the runs in control mode. Then the intended message becomes absolutely meaningless if
Eve randomly applies Ct0,0 or C
t
1,1 on qubit t in every message mode run, as mentioned in [2]. Yet, in the (two-way)
quantum dialogue protocol presented in [2] the control mode was modified so that Eve can by no means distinguish
between runs in control mode and in message mode. Thus, she cannot avoid a control mode run and the quantum
dialogue protocol in [2] is immune from such a kind of disturbing trick. Nevertheless, if the obstinate Eve still wishes
to do that trick, the Alice-Bob pair state when qubit t came back to Bob after Alice’s encoding and after Eve had
at random applied an operator Ctu,v (with u, v ∈ {0, 1}) is |Ψi⊕k⊕u,j⊕l⊕v〉ht , up to a global phase factor. Unless
u = v = 0, Eve is inevitably disclosed after Bob’s Bell measurement. Obviously, the probability of detecting Eve is
again 3/4.
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